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ing the local law was the one to construe the will: Applegate v.
Smith, 31 Mo. 168. The proper rule, therefore, and the one in
accord with the analogies and present authorities of this branch of
the law would seem to be that it is not at all a question of what
law the testator had in view, but that, in construction, the law of
the situs must govern: Whart. Confl. Laws, sect. 597.
J. P. ]KIRLuN.
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NEW ENGLAND TRUST CO. v. EATON.
Where a trustee of a fund which is held for the benefit of a life tenant with
remainder over, purchases as an investment bonds at a premium, be may retain out
of the interest such sums annually as will restore to the fund, at the maturity of the
bonds, exactly what was taken therefrom at the time of purchase. (MoUTox, C. J.,
HoLomEs and ALLEN, JJ., dissenting.)
Hemenway v. Hemenway, 134 Mass. 446, distinguished.

The right of the trustee to retain such sums out of the income may be adjudicated
by the probate court upon the settlement of an annual account of the trustee.

THE material facts appear in the opinion of the court, which was
delivered by
DEVENS, J.-This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree
of the probate court, by which the account of the New England
Trust Company, a trustee holding a fund, the income of which was
payable to a tenant for life, with remainder over, was disallowed.
The system which had been pursued by the trustee with reference
to the investments which it had made in bonds and other promises
to pay of the United States government, or of municipal or railroad corporations, due on a certain day, for which premiums bad
been paid, was to ascertain, by tables in use among bankers and
brokers, what was, in fact, the net income arising from these promises-considering the premium actually paid by the investing
trustee, which would not be repaid at the maturity of the bond, the
rate of interest, the date of payment of the security-and to pay
over this net income to the life-tenant ; the difference between this
net income and the actual rate of interest as received, going to a
fund which, at the date of the maturity of the promise, would leave
the original capital intact. The decree appealed from directed the

NEW ENGLAND TRUST CO. v. EATON.

trustee to pay to the life-tenant, as income, the sums thus retained
for the purpose of being returned to capital.
Whether the question presented may be heard and adjudicated
by the probate court, and then by this court, on appeal, has been
doubted. The New England Trust Company is a testamentary
trustee, compelled by statute to render its accounts at least once a
year to the probate court, of the hearing on which the fullest notice
must be given, and the question is one immediately connected with
the administration of the trust. The probate court has full power
to see and provide that every interest shall be fully represented,
and it is to be observed that this court has also, concurrently with
the Supreme Judicial Court, full jurisdiction to hear and determine
in equity all matters in relation to trusts created by will: P. S., c.
141-143. It had the right to determine whether, upon the account
rendered by the trustee, it was its duty to account for the sums it
had set aside as a part of the capital of the estate, or as its income,
and to hold or pay them over accordingly.
Without discussing those cases in which it has been held that, in
settling the accounts of the executors of a will, the relative rights
of legatees under a -Will, and other questions arising under the
will in reference thereto, cannot be decided; all of which are
not, perhaps, fully reconcilable; they do not affect the question of
jurisdiction here involved: Granger v. Basset, 98 Mass. 4.69;
(,owdinr v. Perry, 11 Pick. 512; Burbanik v. Whitney, 24 Id.
151, first paragraph. Even if we should hold that it was intended
that in the administration of an estate the probate court should not
pass upon the difficult questions of construction often arising out
of wills, but should determine simply the amount of property subject to distribution, it could not affect the present inquiry. The
specified object of requesting trustees to render annual accounts, is
to ascertain whether the trustee has properly dealt with the trust
property. In such a case as the one at bar, the trustee necessarily
includes in his account the payments he has made, and describes
the investments in which he holds the trust property. If he has
paid over to the tenant for life that to which the tenant was not
entitled, he should not be allowed therefor; and if, on the other
hand, he has transferred tothe corpus of the fund that which he
should not, this should be corrected. Before the hearing in the
probate court, and in this court, upon the account of trustees,
questions similar to the principal one in the case, at bar have here-
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tofore been determined. See Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick.
446. It was determined whether a sum received by the trustees
of an estate was rightfully paid to the widow of a testator, instead
of being reinvested by the trustees as a part of the capital of the
trust funds. In Heard v. -ldredge, 109 Mass. 258, upon the
appeal by the life tenant from the decree of the probate court
allowing an account by which a certain sum was treated as capital,
and not as the income of a trust fund, the decree of the probate
court was affirmed. To the same effect are Bowker v. Pierce, 130
Mass. 262, and Dodd v. Winship, 133 Id. 859. The case of Wright
v. White, 136 Id. 470, is not inconsistent with the view that, upon
the settlement of an" account of the trustee, it may be determined
whether a sum of money should be treated as the capital or the
income of a trust fund. The decree upon such an account deals
only with what has been done in the past, although a decree allowing an account of what has been done may afford a guide in ascertaining what will be allowed in the future. What is said on this
subject in Wright v. - White, ubi supra, is that in a decree allowing
an account a direction as to the mode in which a trustee should
thereafter manage the trust fund, was not properly a part of the
decree allowing an account, and was to be stricken out.
We proceed, then, to consider whether the course pursued by the
trustee was correct, and thus whether the account of what he has
done is to be allowed. It is the general rule that when investments
are made in property of a permanent character, and not in terminable securities, the loss or gain in such investment is that of the
cor7us of the estate. If, for any cause, it be reduced in value,
and it becomes necessary to sell it, the sum for which it is sold becomes a new principal, on which the life tenant is to receive the
income. In the management of real estate, when permanent improvements are placed thereon, these are a proper charge of the
capital, while usual and ordinary repairs, when made, are a deduction from the income: Parsons v. Winslow, 16 Mass. 361. If a
trustee purchases shares in the capital stock in a bank, inasmuch
as the remainder-man will receive exactly that which is purchased,
the tenant for life should receive the full income thereof undiminished. Such was the course pursued by the trustee in the case at
bar, in regard to the bank shares purchased by it. Nor does it
become the duty of the trustee to sell such shares, should they appreciate in value after he has invested in them, and pay over to the
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tenant for life the amount which they have increased in value. If
it becomes necessary to sell such shares in the proper administration of the trust estate, the gain or loss is that of the capital of the
estate, and the sum recovered constitutes a new principal.
The tenant for life does not seek any order by which the bonds,
the interest on which is here under discussion, are to be sold or the
investments changed; nor can it be contended that these securities
are not of a class in which trustees may invest, if due care has been
used in the selection. The rule "that no investment can be considered safe or can be approved by a probate court or court of equity,
except in public securities, however well supported by authorities,"
says Chief Justice SHAW, '"as a rule well established in English
courts of equity, is wholly inapplicable and untenable in this
country:" Lovellv. Minot, 20 Pick. 116. While there are now many
more public securities than those which existed when this remark was
made, investments cannot be confined to them. A loan at a. fixed
rate of interest, even if secured by the stock of a manufacturing or
other business corporation as collateral security, if proper security is
taken against fluctuations, is necessarily injudicious: Brown v.
French, 125 Mass. 410. There are many stocks under public supervision-bonds of corporations-where there is sufficient capital to insure their safety, which, with bonds of municipalities, loans secured by
mortgage, constitute proper investments. The purchase of the bonds
by the trustee appears to have been judiciously made. Substantially all have appreciated in value, and they are of the class of
securities contemplated as investments by the statute under which
the trustee does its business: St. 1869, c. 182, § 5 ; St. 1871, c.
142; P. S., c. 116, § 20.
Assuming that the purchase of bonds even at a premium, was
safe, prudent, and such as judicious men would make in the conduct
of their affairs, which is substantially the rule heretofore laid down,
the question arises: Inasmuch as it is certain that the corpus of the
fund is to be diminished if this investment is permanent, whether
the trustee may retain such sums annually as will restore to the
fund at its maturity exactly what was taken therefrom at the time
of the purchase? This is what the trustee has undertaken to do.
If, as suggested in argument, there is any inaccuracy in the calculation by which this result is reached, this is a subordinate matter,
to be determined by more accurate accounting should it be required,
not necessary now to be discussed. That which is really income
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from a bond purchased at a price above par, say 120, and payable
in ten years, is not the amount received in interest annually, but
that amount deducting therefi'om the sum necessary to restore at
the end of the ten years the $20 premium. No prudent manwould
treat as income from his property the whole amount received when
there was thus to be a dimifution of his principal, amounting at
the end of the ten years to this premium, and steadily tending to
this during the entire period. To deal with interest thus received
as income purely, would, to the extent of the premium, exhaust the
capital. The premium paid is no more than an advance from capital, which the remainder-man is entitled to have repaid if he is
entitled to receive the capital intact. If, in such a case, the tenant
for life should die before the maturity of the bond, and thus the
whole advance not then be repaid, he would have paid no more than
his just proportion. Unless the premium is to be restored it is not
easy to see how investments in bonds having a premium can be
made in justice to the remainder-man, whose property (where a bond
is kept to maturity) is diminished solely for the benefit of the tenant for life. Into the question how much income an investment, at
a premium, in a bond, payable at a fixed future time, produces, the
loss of the premium at that time necessarily enters as a factor. The
bonds purchased by the trustee have substantially all appreciated
in value; and this, to such an extent that if they were niow sold,
the surplus beyond the sum which would be necessary to restore to
the capital all that was paid at the time of purchase by way of premium would enable the trustee to pay the tenant for life the deductions that have heretofore been made in order to repair the principal
at the maturity of the bond. The life-tenant, therefore, insists that
the trustee should now be ordered to pay to her those sums, as, if a
sale were made at this moment, they would not be needed to repair
any deficiency in the principal.
The trustee is to manage the fund in his hands, not for the purpose of speculation, "but in regard to the permanent disposition of
the fund :" Harvard College v. Armory, 9 Pick. 461; Lovell v.
Minot, 20 Id. 116. The argument of the tenant for life, that the
practice of holding securities until their maturity would deprive
him of the "1every care and ability in the management of the trust,
for which he pays compensation to the trustee," 'can readily be
pressed so far as to sanction the practice of trading and trafficking
in trust securities, which would be attended with dangerous results
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to the trust fund. Investments carefully and judiciously made are
not, as a general rule, to be disturbed. The argument of the tenant
asserts that the income obtained for the tenant is less than one-half
of that which might be obtained on absolutely safe mortgages. The
case affords no evidence of this, nor in this proceeding, which only
concerns the account of the trustee, and the amount of his payments
to the tenant, could it be settled whether, in this view, the trustee
should be ordered to dispose of the securities.
But, if the securities were sold and a larger sum realized than
would be necessary to restore to the corpus of the estate that which
was taken from it when they were purchased, the question would
still be whether the appreciation of the securities in market value
was the property of the tenant for life or of the remainder-man.
There is no ground on which it can be contended to belong to the
tenant for life, unless he is also to be made responsible where loss
occurs in the purchase and subsequent sale of securities. There
cannot be this chance of profit for him unless there is to be a corresponding risk in such transactions. If the rule that when a
security is kept to maturity, income is to be paid only to such an
extent as shall leave the corpus of the estate at that time intact by
restoring to it the premium paid at the time of purchase, be just,
it is equally just that the gain or loss that occurs by a sale thereof,
if for any cause one shall become necessary while it is running,
should be that of the corpus of the fund. The estate of the tenant
for life will be unaffected thereby, except so far as it may be altered
when a change is made in securities by the increase or diminution
of the sum to be re-invested. To expose the estate of the tenant
for life to any risk beyond what is involved iu this, and, because
there may be a possible chance for gain under some circumstances
by changes in investments ; to subject it to the loss which occurs,
when, for any cause, it becomes necessary to sell, at a diminished
price, securities purchased for the trust estate, would be to defeat
the object for which tenancies for life are in most cases created.
In Parsons v. Winslow, ubi supra, there had been a loss to the
trust estate by the defalcation of the trustee, whose successor had
been able to recover from bim in value only a portion of the property originally intrusted to him. It was held that the diminished
fund thus received would constitute a new principal, and that the
loss would thus " be apportioned in the same manner as if it had
arisen from the fali in the price or value of any public stocks or of
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any land in which the fund should have been invested according to
the provisions of the will." It is said by Mr. Justice JACKSON:
" It would be unjust and contrary to the manifest intent of the testator, if the tenant for life, on the one hand, should continue to
receive the whole amount of the interest on the original fund after
the principal had been thus reduced ; or if, on the other hand, the
income should be applied to replace the principal. In the one case,
the tenant for life would be left for an indefinite period without any
support or benefit from the intended bounty of the testator; and in
the other, the remainder-man might loose all that was intended for
him."
It has been suggested that a suspense account might be kept by
the trustee, to which sums, such as have in the case at bar been
retained, might be carried; and if hereafter the bonds should be
sold before maturity at an advance, the life-tenant would be entitled
to receive therefrom all that was not required to restore the capital
originally invested. This suggestion is based upon the theory that
any possible profit made by the sale of securities belongs to the tenant for life, and still involves the idea that he must bear the possible
loss. We cannot consider this, except so far as his estate is affected
by the increase or diminution of the sum to be reinvested. Such a
suggestion would require, as a corresponding duty, that when a bond
was depreciating in value there should be retained from the lifetenant's income such sums as would be necessary to repair the loss
to the capital of the estate by such depreciation, should it be sold
before maturity.
There can ordinarily be no better test of the income which a sum
of money will produce, having regard to the rights of both the
tenant for life and the remainder-man, than the interest which can
be received from a bond which sells above par, and is payable at the
termination of a fixed term, deducting from such interest as it
becomes due such sums as will at maturity efface the premium. If
such a bond has increased in value since its purchase, assuming it
to have been an entirely safe investment, and none other should
have been made, it has been because a change in the'rates of interest, or some similar cause, has altered market values. There would
be no reason to suppose that such a bond could be sold, and the
amount received reinvested at any higher rate of interest, unless at
the sacrifice of some safeguard in the investment. The investments
of trust property should be made with a view to permanency, and
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not in any spirit of speculation; nor should changes be made except
after much inquiry and circumspection, and ordinarily with an
immediate and advantageous reinvestment in contemplation- In
making such changes the trustees are not entitled so to exercise
their authority as to vary or affect the relative rights of the cestuis
que trust: Hill on Trusts 483.
The only case in this country which we have found, or to which
we have been referred, deciding the question we have considered, is.
Farwell v. Tweddle, 10 Abb. N. 0. 94, in which it was held that
a course similar to that pursued by the trustee in this case was correct and proper. Not much assistance was to be expected from the
English cases, as until 22 & 23 Vict. c. 85, § 32, authorizing investments in East India stock, only one security, the 3 per cent.
consols, bank stock, was there recognised as proper for trust-estates.
An investment in the 3 per cents, which it is not contemplated will
ever be paid, and the holders of which have been considered as perpetual annuitants, has been dee med the only safe investment, and
peculiarly adapted for the purpose, as. until a recent period, they
have been below par. The principle is well established by all the
English cases that the oryus of the trust capital is to-be kept intact,
so that the remainder-man may thus receive it, while, in justice to
the life-tenant, it must be kept in income-producing property.
When the testator makes a general gift of his estate to, or in trust
for, a person for life, with remainder over, so, much of the property
as consists of leaseholds, terminable annuities, or other interests of
a perishable nature, must be converted and. invested in these permanent securities. As they are permanent, whether purchased above
or below par, the life-tenant receives the full income, the remainderman receives undiminished that which has been purchased, and no
adjustment of the relative rights of the cestuis que trustent has been
necessary. It is contemplated that there may be specific gifts of
terminable or perishable securities which shall show an intention on
the part of the testator that the life-tenant may exhaust or consume
them, in which case reinvestment, would not be required, nor indeed
proper.. In the absence of these, if, in contradiction of the general
rule, the trustees suffer the tenant for life to receive the whole income
arising from such securities, he will be decreed to refund what he
may have received, over and above what he would have received if
the conversion had been duly made and the proceeds invested in the
:. per cents. This difference is treated as capital to be invested
VOL. XXXIV.-22
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for the benefit of all parties entitled, and the tenant for life is bound
to make it good in the first instance. On his failure, the trustees
are responsible therefor: Hill on Trusts, sect. 386, and Perry on
Trusts, sect. 547.
The same principles have been applied since investments of trust
funds were, by the statute of 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, permitted to
be made in East India stock, which is a security that, as well as
certain other stocks named, may be redeemed. The courts have
constantly refused to allow any investments to be made therein,
unless there were peculiar reasons for favoring the life-tenant, or at
the request and on the application of the settler of the trust:
-EquitableBev. nt. Soc. v. -Fuller,1 Johns. & H. 379; Remenway
v. Hemenway, 134 Mass. 446. In such cases the direction has
sometimes been, that the investment shoild not be made unless the
stock could be purchased at par: Waite v. Littlewood, 41 L. J. (N.
S.), ch. 636. One reason given in Coceburn v. Peel, 5 De Gex,
F. & J. 170, for refusing to permit a purchase of East India stock,
was that it must be purchased at an advance, and that there was no
provision in the act for any sinking fund by which the deficiency
made could be supplied.
In flume v. Richardson,4 De Gex, F. & J. 29, it was held that
for the period between the death of the testator and the passing of
the statutes 22 & 23 Vict. c.-35, the life-tenant was entitled only
to such income as she would have received had the stock been converted and invested in consols; and that although, after the passage
of this statute, she was entitled to the whole income, yet the trustees were only justifiable in keeping the East India stock until a
suitable investment could be made in land, in which, by the will,
the trustees were directed to invest.
Brown v. Gellatly, L. R., 2 Oh. 751, decides no more on this
subject than that when the testator authorizes investments as permanent, which would otherwise be unauthorized, the life tenant has
the full income. This authority, given by the will, indicated a
preference of the life-tenant to this extent, which took the case out
of the ordinary rule. "I understand," says the chancellor, "the
words of the will as amounting to the constitution by the testator
of a larger class of authorized securities than the court would have
approved of, and the court has merely to follow his directions, and
treat the income accordingly as being the income of authorized
securities." Other securities not coming within this class were
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ordered by the chancellor to be converted as soon as possible, and
until this could be done, the life-tenant would be entitled thereon
"to the dividends on so much three per cent. stock as would have
been produced by the conversion and investment of the property at
the end of the year."
The method in which the English courts deal with leasehold
estates, a common species of terminable securities not known in the
same form inthe United States, when they are settled in trust for
life, with remainders over, under such circumstances that the settler
must have regarded them as continuing interests for all the beneficiaries of the trust, including the remainder-man, is strictly analogous to that which the trustee in the case at bar has pursued. These
estates, which are terminable on a life or lives, or at the end of
fixed terms, are renewable, sometimes by express contract, and
sometimes by custom which has been recognised as legal, upon the
payment of certain fines and other expenses. It is held to be the
duty of the trustees to preserve the leasehold estates by renewing,
at the usual periods, for the benefit of the parties in remainder. In
the absence of other direction by the settler, the fine, &c., for
renewal is to be paid out of the rents and profits in the proportion
in which the cestuis que trust enjoy the estate. If a renewal becomes impracticable, the tenant for life does not reap the whole
advantage of non-payment of the sum properly due for renewal, if
there was an express trust for renewal. His interest, minus the
expenses of the renewal, is all that is given him, and his proportion of the amount fairly to be paid for renewal is still a proper
charge on the leasehold estate for the benefit of the remainder.
When the leasehold estate is for years, the amount to be paid is
readily ascertainable by the proportion which the tenant for life
enjoys of the leasehold estate; and when it is for lives, and there
is no express fund created for the renewal, it is more difficult, and
the court has sanctioned the plan of insuring the lives of the cestuis
que vie to an amount sufficient to cover the usual expense of renewing on the dropping of a life: Hill on Trusts 436. While the cases
on this subject are complicated by the express provisions made in
the settlements, and appear in some respects confused, they establish fully the position that, in the absence of direction otherwise,
the property received is to be turned over by the tenant for life as
he received it, and that his income is not the full rent and profit,
but those after deducting therefrom, as accurately as it can be ascer-
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tained, his just proportion of the expense of maintaining the security by renewal of the lease.
The tenants for life rely much upon .femenwayt v. .1emenway,
134 Mass. 446. This was a bill in equity by which was brought
before us the whole management of a large estate, in which very
ample discretionary powers had been given to trustees. The testator
had left, subject to the trust, bonds payable at a fixed period. As
between the tenant for life and the remainder-man, it was decreed
that the trustees, by the authority conferred by the clause of the
will "to hold the said property as they may receive the same, or at
their discretion to sell the same," were entitled to continue their
investments as such, and to retain these bonds until they were paid
off, and that, "the whole net income of the investments thus authorized must go to the tenants for. life, by the terms of the will."
There was also an investment made by the trustees in certain
bonds, having nearly eighteen years to run, on which a small premium had been paid. The case was decided upon its own peculiar
circumstances, which, so far as disclosed, were held to show no
special reason why the tenant for life should not receive the intereat paid on the bonds. The investment constituted "a very small
proportion of a large estate," and Mr. Justice HoLMEs remarks:
" We have no reason to doubt that, taking the whole administration
of the trust into account, the balance has been evenly held between
the two parties, and the relation between the remainder-man and
the life-tenants is such that there is less call than there might be
in some other cases for treating the life-tenant with great strictness."
It certaiily was not held that the trustee might not, for the trust
estate, purchase, under some circumstances, at a premium, bonds
payable at a fixed time, and, exercising his discretion honestly and
for the purpose of dealing fairly with both parties, might not
reserve, as received, some portion of that paid as interest, sufficient
at the end of the period to restore the premium to the capital, by
the loss of which it would otherwise be depleted.
Upon the account rendered by the trustee in the case at bar, as
heretofore said, the question whether, by virtue of our supervision
over trusts, the trustee should be ordered to change his investments,
is not sought to be brought before us. Upon. these, as they exist,
the deduction from the full interest reserved to restore the premium
at the end of the term, was properly made. It is only thus that
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the property can be turned over to the remainder-man undiminished. If the estate of the tenant for life terminates before the
bond expires, the cost of effacing the premium will be borne in the
right proportion by the respective cestuis que trust.
In the opinion of the majority of the court, the entry should be,
"Decree reversed."
HOLMES, J. (disgenting).-If the opinion of the majority rests
on the ground that, so far as appears, the trustees might have made
their investments with the intent to keep them until the trust expired or the bonds matured, and in the exercise of its discretion is
a business manager, in view of the particular circumstances of the
case, thought it necessary to retain a fund in suspense against a
probable loss of premium, speaking for myself alone, I should have
been disposed to acquiesce in that opinion. But from the main line
of reasoning actually adopted, I must dissent, upon grounds both
of'principle and authority.
Shortly stated, I understand that reasoning to be this : That if a
bond is bought at a premium. it must be assumed that the premium
is paid, for the single reason that the rate of interest on the bond
is higher than the market rate, because it must be assumed that the
investment is absolutely safe; that, therefore, the analogy of wasting
investments, such as leaseholds, applies, and that an annual deduction from interest is proper.
So far, this is precisely the argument that was pressed upon us
with much force in Remenway v. Hemenway, and which was
rejected after the gravest deliberation. A great part of the opinion
was devoted to answering it, and it still seems to me that the discussion was necessary to the decision of the case. Hemenway v.
tlemenway, did not bring before us the whole administration of the
estate, but certain specific questions, one of which was whether
the interest should make good the premium paid by trustees for
bonds purchased by them above par. If the rule now adopted had
been recognised, it would have been unnecessary and improper to
look beyond the particular bonds to the rest of the account. It
was because that rule was repudiated that it was said, and deliberately said, that nothing showed that the premium was paid for
interest above the market rate, and that the whole administration
of the trust might be considered. The latter principle is not the
law in jurisdictions when authorized investments are limited in
number, as in New York, but each investment is dealt with sepa-
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rately. The only reason for departing from the precedents elsewhere was, that in the latitude allowed trustees in this Commonwealth, it was thought impossible to assume that premiums were
paid in respect of interest alone. I think, therefore, that the
opinion of the majority is opposed to one of the points directly
decided in Hemenway v. Hemenway, as it certainly is to the whole
course of reasoning in that case, and I am confirmed in my opinion
by the fact that two other of the four surviving justices who took
part in the decision are of the same mind. I must suppose that
Hemenway v. Hemenway has been accepted by trustees as expressing the settled opinion of the court. I cannot foresee the extent
or nature of the evil that may follow from our abandoning what
has been acted on as law. But I should be most unwilling to overrule a depision which I supposed to have been accepted as a guide
in dealing with property, even if I thought it wrong. I do not,
however, think either the decision or the reasoning in Remenway v.
Hemenway wrong, and I refer to that case for what I do not deem
it necessary to repeat here.
But I understand the opinion of the majority not to stop with
overruling Hemenway v. ifemenway. In this case the bonds thus
far have not depreciated, but have risen, in value. No part of the
premium has been lost as yet; but the argument is either that it is
to be presumed that the bonds will be -kept until the premium is
lost, or else that the approach to maturity is a constantly acting
cause which depreciates the bond so much each year with mathematical certainty, and that even if the depreciation is disguised by
a more powerful motion the other way, it must be allowed for, because the rise in value belongs wholly to the corpus, and would
have been so much greater but for the counteracting influence. I
think I fully appreciate the logical force of this argument, but it
appears to me to illustrate the danger of relying on logic when your
premises are fictitious. The necessary premise for casting the
whole burden of repaying premiums upon interest is, that the premium is paid solely for interest above the market rate.- If that
premise is a fiction, as I think it is, and if considerations of policy
are held, nevertheless, to justify its adoption, at least the conclusion
to be drawn from it should be guarded and restrained by considerations of a similar nature. I can hardly think that if the trust had
been terminated, or the bonds sold, at the date of the account,
when the coupons had actually gained by the investment, the sums
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retained from interest would be paid over to the remainder-man.
Yet that conclusion would follow from the reasoning. I think, in
other words, that the question of holding the balance even between
tenant for life and remainder-man is a problem so dependent on the
particular facts, and so complex, that while we cannot hope to
solve it with perfect accuracy, every one would feel that to cut the
knot with a formula, in the case I have supposed, would be an unnecessary abandonment of the discriminations within our power,
and, as a practical judgment, would be as likely to work injustice
as justice.
If I am right so far, what difference can it make that the trustee
has not sold? Whether it is or is not true, as is said in .femenway
v. ffemenwa~y, that a determination not to sell, if a sale is possible,
stands on much the same footing as a purchase, I apprehend that
if a trustee, having the usual powers, sells and reinvests twenty
times in as many days, he is not ipso facto guilty of a breach of
trust, and that if the reinvestments are proper and profitable his
conduct would not be open to animadversion. On this point the
English books can give us no light. At all events this trustee
might sell now if it saw fit. On what ground is the determination
of the trustee not to sell-a determination which the court cannot
revise-to change the relative rights of the cestuis que trust ?
Let us look a little further into the rule adopted. Suppose a sale
to have taken place, and other bonds to have been bought at a price
above par. The trustee will, of course, compute the rate of interest
to be received by the tenant for life in the future, by deducting the
annual sums necessary to replace the new premium paid. But there
is no particular sanctity in the rate which happened to prevail at the
moment of purchase; still less in the rate artificially determined by
the premium paid. If there has been no sale, but the market price
of the bonds has risen, ex hypothesis the rate of interest is conclusively proved to have fallen, because the fall in the current rate of
interest is the only recognised ground for a rise in price. Why is
not the remainder-man entitled to have a new computation started
on that footing ? Why is not the tenant for life entitled to have
the reservation diminished if the rate of interest rises ? And pushing the principle to its logical result, why is not the trustee bound
to follow the fluctuations of the market from day to day, attributing
them all to the fluctuations of interest, as he is bound to do ?
I now recur to the premises of the argument which I am opposing.
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I repeat what was said in Remenwa v. Ilemenway, that I do not
see how we can start with the assumption that all proper investments
are absolutely safe, when the leading case in this state is to the very
point that an investment may be unsafe, and yet justifiable: Lovell v.
Minot, 20 Pick. 116. But the assumption appears to me to be inconsistent with facts which we must notice, and to lead to the conclusion
not yet mentioned which wecould not accept. Within a few years the
first mortgage 4 per cent. bonds of a flourishing railroad have sold at
85, while at the same time United States 4 per cents stood at 120
or more, and city 4 per cents of a high rank stood at about par.
The differences were not to be accounted for by the difference of time
which the bonds had to run, or by exemption from taxation. I
should be surprised to learn that either bond was not a proper
investment. If they all were proper investments, the difference in
price could not be referred to difference in interest.
Again, if the fiction of safety be adopted, I still do not see why
it does not follow that if a bond is bought below par the tenant for
life is equally entitled to an annual increment on the interest
received by him as the bond gradually approaches maturity. This
was argued in BHemenway v. Hemenway, but I must believe that
such a doctrine would disconcert trustees not a little. Of course it
would call for sales of capital from time to time to produce funds for
the tenant for life beyond the amount received on the bonds. There
is a well-known bond which was purchased by trustees a few years
ago at 50 per cent, and which now stands at 120 or over. How is
a case like that to be dealt with?
If it be said that the consequences suggested follow only upon an
attempt to carry logic too far, and that they are to be controlled by
practical judgment, I agree. But I think that the same thing
ought to be true of the step now taken, as I have said already.
If we are to start with a fiction, and then apply logic, I think
these results follow. If we are to use our judgment, I do not see
why we should not use it at every step, and I believe that, to make
the tables referred to the universal arbiter between tenant for life
and remainder-man, is not so near an approach to justice as we
fay hope to make. I am much more disposed to regard trustees
as a sort of domestic tribunal ex necessitate between the parties,
subject to the control of the courts in case of a want of good faith
or reasonable judgment.
Finally, I must repeat what was said in Hemenway v. Hemen-
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way, after an elaborate examination of the English books, that, in
my opinion, the English cases do not apply the principle of wasting
investment to premiums on authorized permanent investments.
But, even if they did, I should consider that, in view of the latitude
of investment allowed in Massachusetts and the great fluctuations
of American securities, it would be undesirable to accept that
principle at present, and still more so to adopt the simple device
of the tables as the means of working out that principle.
I express no opinion upon the question of jurisdiction, which I
have not thought it necessary to examine, as both parties desire to
have the case dealt with upon its merits now.
I am authorized to state that the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
CHARLEs ALLEN concur in the views which I have expressed.

United States Circuit Court, W. D. Michigan.
MINERAL RANGE RAILROAD CO. v. DETROIT & LAKE SUPERIOR
COPPER CO.
A state statute provided that proceedings for the condemnation of land for railway
purposes should be instituted in the probate court of the proper county ; that the
necessity for taking the lands, and their value, should be determined by commissioners
or a jury selected by such court ; and that such proceedings should only be subject
to review by the Supreme Court. Under this statute a railroad company petitioned
tie probate court for the condemnation of defendant's lands. The defendant
answered the petition, and demanded a removal of the case to the federal court.
Held, that the case was removable directly from the probate court.
It is no objection to the jurisdiction of the federal court in such cases that it
involves the exercise of the right of eminent domain.

ON motion to remand.
On the 14th of September, 1885, the Mineral Range Railroad Company filed its petition in the probate court for the county
of Houghton, for the condemnation of certain lands owned by the
defendant in the village of Hancock, for the purpose of constructing
a branch of its road across these lands from Houghton to Hancock.
The defendant shortly thereafter answered the petition, and upon
the same day filed its petition in the probate court for the removal
of the cause to this court, uppn the ground that it was a citizen of
the state of Connecticut. The removal was ordered, and a transcript
of the record immediately filed in this court. The railroad company thereupon moved for the appointment of three commissioners
VOL. XXXIV.-23
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under the statute, accompanying its motion with an oral motion to
remand for want of jurisdiction.
W. P. Healy, for the railroad- company, petitioner.
T. L. Chadbourne,
copper company.

. B. Grant, and Otto Kirchner, for the

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRowN, J.-In delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in
Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 19, Mr. Justice FIELD remarked
that the Removal Act of 1867 covered every possible case involving
a controversy between citizens of the state where the suit was
brought and citizens of other states, if the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeded the sum of $500; that it mattered not
whether the suit was brought in a state court of limited or general
jurisdiction. " The only test was, did it involve a controversy
between citizens of the state and citizens of other states, and did
the matter in dispute exceed a specified amount ? And a controversy was involved in the sense of the statute whenever any property
or claim of the parties capable of pecuniary estimation was the subject of the litigation, and was presented by the pleadings for
judicial determination." That controversies of the general nature
of this are " suits of a civil nature at law" was settled in Boom o.
v. Patterson, 98 U. S.403, which was also a proceeding under a
statute of Minnesota for the condemnation of land under the right
of eminent domain. There is, however, a difference in the methods
of procedure under the two statutes which takes the case under
consideration out of the language of the opinion in the Minnesota
case, and involves it in a difficulty which was not there presented.
In Minnesota the course was for the corporation to apply to the
District Court of the county for the appointment of commissioners to
appraise the value of the land, and take proceedings for its condemnation. If the award of the commissioners was not satisfactory
to either party, an appeal might be taken to the District Court,
where it was entered by the clerk as "a case upon the docket;" the
persons claiming interest in the land being designated as plaintiffs,
and the company seeking its condemnation as defendant. The court
was then required " to proceed to hear and determine such case in
the same manner" that other cases were heard and determined, with
the aid of a jury, unless a jury was waived. The value of the land
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being assessed, the amount of the assessment was to be entered as a
judgment against the company, subject to a review by the Supreme
Court. A similar question arose in one of the Pacific Railroad
Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, and was held to have been answered
by the reasoning in the Patterson Case.
In this state the act provides that, in case the railroad company
is unable to purchase the needed land, it shall present its petition
to the Probate Court, or the judge thereof, with proof of service of
notice to all persons interested, who may show cause against the
prayer of the petition and may disprove any of the facts alleged
therein. Upon hearing the proofs and allegations of the parties, if
no sufficient cause is shown against granting the prayer of the petition, the court or judge shall appoint three freeholders as commissioners to determine the necessity for taking the land, and to
appraise the damages to be allowed to the owner, provided that
either party may demand a jury whose powers shall be the same
as those of the commissioners. Upon the report of the commissioners or the jury being filed, the court shall confirm the same,
unless for good cause shown by either party, and shall direct to
whom the money shall be paid. Within twenty days after the confirmation of the report either party may appeal to the Supreme
Court, specifying the objections to the proceedings, and the Supreme
Court shall pass upon such objections only, all other being deemed
to have been waived.
There is no provision in this act for an appeal to the court from
the award of the commissioners, and the forming of an issue to be
tried by a jury, as were the cases in Minnesota and Kansas. But
if a jury be demanded, the case is at once referred to them, and
they proceed to pass both upon the necessity for condemning the
lands in question, and upon the amount of compensation to be
awarded the owners, acting, as has been held by the Supreme Court,
both as judges of law and of fact, although by the terms of the act,
the judge may attend the jury to decide questions of law and
administer oaths to witnesses. In Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73,
there was also a provision for an appeal from the allowance of the
commissioners appointed by the Probate Court to the Circuit Court
of the county, where an issue was framed for trial by jury. Did
the statute for the condemnation of land also provide for an appeal
from the Probate Court to the Circuit Court, and the framing of an
issue there, we should find no difficulty in holding, as was held in
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that case and in Boom Co. v. Patterson,that the removal should be
had from the Circuit Court, and not from the Probate Court. But
does the failure of the statute to provide for an appeal from the
award of the commissioners to the Circuit Court, and the framing of
an issue there, deprive the case of its removable character ? We
think not. Had the petition been in the general form contemplated
in some cases for the condemnation of all the land within the county
needed for the purposes of the railway, making all the owners along
the line of its road parties defendant, it might be a serious question
whether a single non-resident proprietor whose property was sought
to be taken could remove the case, even so far as it respected himself, to this court, although this also seems to be answered in the
Pacific Railroad Cases, 115 U. S. 19. But we do not find it
necessary to determine whether there might not be cases of this
description to which the removal acts would not apply. In this
case the railroad seeks the condemnation of a single specific parcel
owned by the defendant. To its petition the defendant has filed its
answer, setting forth its reasons why the prayer of the petition
should not be granted. There is here a single, indivisible suit or
controversy to obtain the possession of land in which the railroad
company is plaintiff and the copper company is defendant, and the
case does not differ essentially from an ordinary action of ejectment,
except in the fact that plaintiff offers compensation for the lands it
seeks to condemn.
Further objection is made to our assumption of jurisdiction, for
the reason that it involves the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, which is claimed to be non-judicial in its character, and
therefore a special proceeding, to be carried on solely by virtue of
the statute, in the courts of the state therein designated. The same
position was taken by the landowner in the case above referred to,
viz., that the proceeding to take private property for'public use was
an exercise by the state of its sovereign right of eminent domain,
and with its exercise, the United States, a separate sovereignty, had
no right to interfere. The position was said to be a sound one so
far as the act appropriating the property was concerned; that when
tle use is public, the necessity or expediency of appropriating any
particular property is not a subject of judicial cognisance. " The
property may be appropriated by an act of the legislature, or the
power of appropriating it may be delegated to private corporations,
to be exercised by them in the execution of works in which the
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public is interested. But, notwithstanding the right is one that
appertains to sovereignty, when the sovereign power attaches conditions to its exercise, the inquiry whether the conditions have been
observed is a proper matter for judicial cognisance."
We understand the meaning of this language to be substantially
this: That the right of eminent domain, or of appropriating private
property to public use, is a sovereign right, vested in the state itself,
acting through its legislature; that the state may delegate this right
to railway and other corporations, as it has done in this state, and
may impose upon the exercise of the right such conditions as it
chooses, with reference to the manner in which the application shall
be made, the necessity for the appropriation of any particular lands
determined, and their value ascertained, and when the court observes
that the necessity of appropriating any particular property is not a
subject of judicial cognisance, it means simply that it is not necessarily a subject of judicial cognisance. The legislature may seize
upon and appropriate directly a piece of private property upon paying the owner its value, or it may authorize a corporation to do this
by an appeal to its judicial tribunals. The court itself has no right
to appropriate property ; but in carrying out the will of the legislature, and in making the proper inquiries as to the necessity of the
appropriation and the value of the lands, it is exercising judicial
power. "If that inquiry take the form of a proceeding before the
courts between parties, the owners of the land on the one side, and
the company seeking the appropriation on the other, there is a controversy which is subject to the ordinary incidents of a civil suit,
and its determination derogates in no respect from the sovereignty
of the state." In the Minnesota case, as reported in 3 Dill. 465,
it appears that the boom company was authorized by a special act
to condemn the land necessary to its business, while in this state
the same power is conferred by a general act upon all railroad companies. There is, however, no practical difference in the nature
of the power vested in the courts in each case.
It is true, there are some expressions in the cases of Toledo, &C.,
1Ry. Co. v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 466, 452, and Port .Turon, ft.,
BRy. Co. v. JVoorieis, 50 Mich. 506, which indicate that, in the
opinion of the Supreme Court, these proceedings to condemn lands
are not in themselves, and never have been, regarded as judicial
proceedings, because the legislature might, and sometimes does,
authorize such proceedings to be carried on before highway commis-

182

MINERAL RANGE R. R. CO. v. DETROIT, &a., CO.

sioners or other non-judicial bodies, and because, even when acting
by appointment from a court-of justice, the jury or commissioners
are judges of the law as well as of the facts. But Mr. Justice
CAMPBELL afterwards qualifies this remark to a certain extent by
observing that "they are not judicial proceedings in the ordinary
sense;" a comment in which we entirely concur. We understand,
however, that whenever a court of justice is called upon to determine or adjust the rights of two or more parties standing adversely
to each other, the court is acting in a judicial capacity, whether
the decision of the question presented lies with a judge, or a jury,
commissioners or referees selected by the court. Especially is this
the case when such proceedings are subject to review by an appellate tribunal. In In re New York Cent. Rd., 56 N. Y. 407,
409, the Court of Appeals held that the power of determining what
lands were necessary to be appropriated to the use of railways was
a judicial question, and, when controverted, the facts must obviously, in some form, be laid before the court to enable it to decide.
So, in Warren v. Wisconsin Rd., 6 Biss. 425, which was also
a proceeding to condemn land for railway purposes, a motion was
made to remand, on the ground that, as it was a proceeding by the
state in the exercise of its right of eminent domain, the suit was to
be regarded as substantially a suit against the state, of which the
federal court had no jurisdiction. The motion, however, was
denied; the court holding that the state had no interest in
the controversy, and that, although it was a special proceeding, it
was a suit within the meaning of removal acts. In Railway Co. v.
Whitton's Adm'r., 13 Wall. 270, the Supreme Court holds that
when a general rule as to property, or personal right or injuries to
either, is established by state legislation, its enforcement by the
federal courts in a case between proper parties is a matter of course,
and the jurisdiction of the court in such case is not subject to state
limitation. In Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449,
it was said that the term "suit" was certainly a very comprehensive one, and was understood to apply to any proceeding in a
court of justice by which an individual pursues that remedy which
the law affords him. But we think this point is also covered by
the case of Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 867, in which the
Circuit Court was sustained in assuming jurisdiction of a proceeding
to enforce the right of eminent domain in favor of the United States,
to condemn lands for a government building, although there was no
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statute authorizing the proceeding. That it was a suit was said to
admit of no question. If proceedings to condemn be a suit, then
the conduct and determination of such suit must be an exercise of
judicial power.
But conceding that if the only question in this case were the
amount of damages to be paid by the railroad company, the jurisdiction of this court would be sustained by the authorities above
cited, it is insisted that these cases are inapplicable, because by the
statute of this state the jury or commissioners must pass upon
the question of the necessity for taking the property, as well as the
amount of damages to be awarded. But we think that in this particular counsel overlook the distinction between the power to condemn, which confessedly resides in the state, and proceedings to
condemn, which the state has delegated to its courts. The proceeding is certainly not deprived of its character as a suit by reason
of its taking cognisance of this additional question ; and if it be a
suit, the right of removal attaches. Wherever a right is given by
the law of a state, and the courts of such state are invested with
the power of enforcing such right, the proceeding may be removed
to a federal court if the other requisites of removability exist.
The motion to remand must be denied, and the case will proceed
in the manner provided for in the state statute.
Natureof Removable Suits.-The opinion of the principal case fully accords
with the previous rulings of the courts,
on the points involved, and contains a
very clear statement of the proper construction of the federal removal act as to
the nature of a removable suit. The
language of the several removal acts
concerning the nature of the suit is quite
broad. Sect. 639, of the Act of 1866,
provides for the removal of " any suit
* * wherein the amount in dispute * *
exceeds the sum or value of five hundred dollars," and, of course, there must
be either diversity of citizenship of the
parties to the suit, or its determination
must depend upon the construction of a
federal law. " Any suit of a civil nature at law or in equity," is the language
of sect. 2 of the Removal Act of March
3d, 1875 ; the language of either act
being broad enough to embrace all suits

of a civil nature where the sum in dispute exceeds $500, unless it was not
contemplated by Congress that the federal courts should have jurisdiction of
certain causes which, from their peculiar nature, belong exclusively to the
state courts. The nature of the controversy is not essential to determine the
question of removability, for the right
of removal arises from the laws of Congress alone. This proposition, although
at first doubted, is now well established.
State legislation cannot impair the jurisdiction of the federal courts over controversies between citizens of different
states: Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 175 ;
Su!dam v. JBroadnax, 14 Pet. 67 ; Union
Bank v. Jolly's Administrators, 18 flow.
503. " All cases which fall within the
ordinary notion of an action at law. or
contract, or tort, or of a suit in equity,
are undoubtedly embraced by the lan-
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guage" of the removal acts: Dillon on
Removal, 3d ed. p. 49, sect. 41.
Test of Bemovability.-Is there a controversy between citizens of different
states, is the controlling question. The
general principle applicable is thatacontroversy between citizens is involved in
a suit whenever any property or claim
of the parties, capable of pecuniary estimation, is the subject of the litigation,
and is presented by the pleadings for
judicial determination. This rule was
laid down in Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S.
20, and has been subsequently reaffirmed :
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403;
Northern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Lowenberg, 18 Fed. Rep. 339 (U. S. Cir. Ct.
Dist. Oregon). If such a controversy is
involved, this constitutes a suit within
the meaning of the removal act, and may
be transferred to the federal courts, provided, of course, that the suit is between
citizens of different states, or there is a
federal question involved, and the amount
in dispute exceeds $500, notwithstanding
that it may have been brought in a state
court of limited jurisdiction : Gaines v.
Fuentes, supra; Dillon on Removal of
Causes, 3d ed., p. 60, sect. 48. But see
Rathbone Oil Co. v. Ranch, 5 West Va.
79, where it is held that no motion to
remove a cause can be made before a
justice of the peace, for the reason that
this is not a state court within the meaning of the law of Congress. Th'e act
y
reads "an state court."
Condemnation Proceedngs.-Thisquestion has been more frequently contested,
perhaps, in condemnation proceedings
than in any other kind of cases, and
several close points have been raised as
to the propriety or right of the federal
courts to assume jurisdiction of such proceedings.
1. It has been urged that such are not
judicial proceedings ; that the exercise
of the right of eminent domain belongs
exclusively to the state, and that the fact
that it is delegated by the state legislature to corporations does not give the

proceedings a judicial character. This
reasoning is specious. In all such proceedings there is necessarily a contest
between the party seeking to condemn
and the owner of the property. The
necessity of the taking and the value are
always involved. These questions are
to be referred to some tribunal which, in
determining them, necessarily exercises
judicial powers, whatever be the nature
of such tribunal in other respects. It
adjusts the rights of the parties, standing
adversely to each other. This is understood to be the province of a court of
justice: A "court is a place where justice is judicially administered," and a
controversy of this kind presents all the
features of a proper case for the judicial
administration of justice. And it can
make no difference, so far as its judicial
capacity is concerned, whether it determines the questions of law or fact as they
arise, or, under the particular state law,
it refers them to a jury, commissioners;
or referees. It is the tribunal which acts.
It is the practice of many impoftant
state courts to refer cises. And the
referee determines both questions of law
and fact, subject to the approval of the
appointing court. Nor does the fact that
the state may, through its legislative department, directly appropriate private
property, destroy the judicial character
of the tribunal it has designated to
assume control of such proceedings, when
such tribunal is acting. See Port Huron,
4-c., Rd. v. Voorhies, 50 Mich. 506;
Toledo, 4-c., Rd. v. Dunlap, 47 Mich.
456, 462; In re N). Y. Cent. Rd. 66
N. Y. 407, 409, where this objection is
fully considered.
2. And it has been contended, that,
although this is a proceeding partaking
of a judicial nature, yet not a judicial
proceeding in the ordinary sense, hence
not a "civil suit" as contemplated by
the removal act.
3. It has also been urged that this is
virtually a proceeding between the state
and the party seeking to condemn, there-
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IllustrationCases.-The cases fully answer these objections. City of Chicago
v. Hutchason et al., 15 Fed. Rep. 129 ;
s. a. 23 Am. Law Reg. 730, was a proceeding by the city of Chicago to condemn land for a public street, in the
Superior Court of Cook county, against
the various owners. Upon application
of a non-resident landowner, the controversy between her and the city was
removed to the federal court.
In Warren v. Wisconsin Valley Rd., 6
Biss. C. C. 425, the railroad company
instituted proceedings to condemn land
under the Wisconsin statute. The damages were appraised by commissioners
appointed by the court. The landowner
appealed to the state Circuit Court.
Under the statute, the-appeal when pro:.
perly perfected, "shall be considered an
action pending in court," the appeal
shall be tried by a jury unless waived,
and judgment shall be rendered thereon according to the rights of the parties. This was held to be a suit of a
civil nature, and removable within the act
of Congress.
In Northern Pac. Terminal co. v.
Lowenberg, 18 Fed. Rep. 339 (Cir. Ct.
D., Oregon), suit was commenced in the
state Circuit Court of Oregon to appropriate land for the use of the railroad
company. Under Oregon laws, a proceeding to condemn land is to be tried
substantially the same as other civil actions. See Gen. Laws of Oregon, p.
533, sects. 42-52, Deady & Lane's ed.
The cause was held removable. DEAD,
J., observed (p. 342) : "There is nothing in the nature or purpose of this action
to prevent its removal to this court. It
is an action brought against the owner
of private property for the puriose of
obtaining it to use it in the construction
and operation of a railway, and at the
same time ascertaining the value of such
right or the amount that ought to he paid
therefor. The statute under which it is
VoL. XXXIV.-24

brought provides, in effect, that it shall
be commenced and proceeded in the final
determination in the same manner as an
ordinary action of law. The plaintiff's
right to appropriate private property to
its use, and the money value of such use,
are in their nature proper subjects of
judicial inquiry. * * * And (p. 343)
the mere fact that the plaintiff derives
its right to appropriate private property.
to its use in virtue of the right of eminent domain, is altogether immaterial.
In granting this right to the plaintiff, the
state has seen proper to impose the condition that in case of a controversy between it and the owner of private property, as to the right of appropriation,
or the value thereof, resort must be
had to a judicial proceeding to determine
it. And of course such proceeding,
when instituted, is subject to the usual
incidents of an ordinary action. or suit,
including the right of removal. In this
respect it stands in exactly the same
category as an action of ejectment to
recover possession of the same prem-

ises."
In Boom Companty v. Patterson, 98 U.
S. 403, the proceeding was to condemn
land. Under the Minnesota statute
(where land was located), the method
of condemning land is, to apply to the
District Court of the county where the
land is situated for the appointment of
commissioners to appraise its value and
take proceedings for its condemnation.
The landowner is to be properly notified,
&c. If the award of the commissioners
is unsatisfactory, either party may appeal
to the District Court, where the proceeding is to be entered by the clerk, " as a
case upon the docket" of the court;
and the persons claiming an interest in
the land, to be designated as plaintiffs,
and the company seeking to condemn, as
defendant. The court is then to "proceed to hear and determine the case."
Issues of fact are to he tried by a jury,
unless a jury be waived. The amount
so found as the value of the land is to be
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jurisdiction to determine the controentered as a judgment against the company, which is subject to review by the versy."
Probate Proceedings.-It has been
Supreme Court of the state, on a writ
of error. Mr. Justice FELD, in speak- questioned whether the federal courts may
acquire jurisdiction of probate proceeding for the court, said (p. 406) : "If
ings under the removal act, it being
that inquiry (referring to condemnation)
takes the form of a proceeding before the insisted that they are matters exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the state courts,
court between parties, the owner of the
and that Congress never intended to
land on the one side, and the company
seeking the appropriation on the other, draw these matters to the federal courts ;
then it is a controversy subject to the and, even if such is the intention, Conordinary incidents of a civil suit." * * * gress has no power to do this. But the
"The proceedings in the present case federal courts have always asserted their
before the commissioners appointed to authority to determine such controversies,
appropriate the land, was in the nature and place them upon the same footing
.of an inquest to ascertain its value, and concerning the right of jurisdiction, as
not a suit at law in the ordinary sense ordinary civil suits, proceeding upon the
of those terms. But when it was trans- principles heretofore stated.
In the leading case of Gainesv.Ahentes,
ferred to the District Court by appeal
from the award of the commissioners, it 92 U. S. 10, the action was brought to
took, under the statutes of the state, the annul a will, and to recall the decree by
form of a sWit at law (p. 407), and was which it was probated, and was instithen eforth subject to its ordinary rules tuted in a state court of Louisiana which
and incidents The point in issue was, had jurisdiction over the estates of dethe compensation to be made to the ceased persons. Mr. Justice 1F-isr , in
owner of the land; in other words, the giving the opinion, made the following
value of the property taken. No other observation, p. 19 : "This act. (the requestion was open to consideration in the moval act), covers every possible case
District Court: Turner v. H lleran, 11 involving controversies between citizens
Minn. 253. The case would have been of the state where the suit is broug'ht and
in no essential particular different had citizens of other states, if the matter in
the state authorized the company by dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the
statute to appropriate the particular pro- sum of $500. Itmattered not whether
perty in question, and the owners to the suit was brought in a state court of
bring suit against the company in the limited or general jurisdiction. The only
courts of law for its value. That a suit test was, did it involve a controversy beof that kind could be transferred from tween citizens of the state and citizens
the state to the federal court, if the con- of other states, and did the matter in
troversy were between the company and dispute exceed a specified sum ?" Payne
a citizen of another state, cannot be v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, is an instructive
doubted. And we perceive no reason case upon this question. The suit was a
against the transfer of the pending case proceeding in equity against an administhat might not be offered against the trator brought by one of the distributees,
case supposed." * * * The court also a citizen of Virginia, to obtain her disrefers to Gaines v. Futentes, supra, and tributive share' in the estate, in the
approves the ruling therein ; concludes United States Circuit Court for the Diswith the following language: " Within trict of Missouri. The jurisdiction of
the meaning of these decisions, we think the federal court was contested on the
the case at bar was properly transferred ground that because of the peculiar
to the Circuit Court. and that it had structure of the Missouri probate system

GANS v. DABERGOTT.
such a proceeding could not be maintained in any other than the probate
court of that state. But it was held that
sucha proceeding was cognisable in the
federal court; that the United States Circuit Court for any district embracing a
particular state will have jurisdiction of
an equity proceeding against an administrator ; "that the equity jurisdiction
conferred on the federal courts is the
same that the High Court of Chancery in
England possesses, is subject to neither
limitation or restraint by state legislation, and is uniform throughout the
different states of the Union."
See
UnitedStates v. Rouland, 4 Wheat. 108 ;
Green's Administrator v. Creighton, 23
How. 90; Robinson v. Campbell, 3
Wheat. 212; Ratt v. Northarn, 5 Mason
95 ; W iliams v. Benedict, 8 How. 107 ;
Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1 ; Tarver
v. Tarver, 9 Id. 174 ; Gaines v. Chews,
2 How. 619 ; Case of Broderick's Will,
21 Wall 503; Barry v. Mercein, 5
How. 103; Craigfe v. McArthur, 4

Dillon 474; Burts v.- Loyd, 45 Ga.
104; Iargroves v. Redd, 43 Id. 143;
Gaines v. Vew Orleans, 6 Wail. 462;
Gainesv. Hennen, 24 How. 553; Mallet
v. Dexter, I Curtis C. C. 178. But see DuVivier v. Hopkins, 116 Mass. 125, which
hold that a proceeding to establish a claim
against the estate of a deceased person,
which was had before a commissioner
appointed by the probate court, which
proceeding, at the time of the application
for removal, was pending, on appeal,
from such commissioner, in the superior
court, could not be removed. Application for the probate of a will cannot be
removed.
n re Frazer, 6 Cir. Mich.
1878 ; 18 Alb. L. J. 353 ; s. c. 7 Cent.
L. ,J.
227.
Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485,, fully
sustains the ruling of Gaines v. Fuentes,
supra. Mr. Justice M&TTHws, in an
elaborate opinion, fully reviews the
cases.
EuGENE McQuMLIN.

St- Louis, Mo.

Prerogative Court of New Jersey.
GANS v. IABERGOTT.
Although a statute authorizing the grant of letters of administration to creditors
upon failure of relatives to apply in a specified time, contains no provision for notice
to the relatives, the Orphans' Court may by rule require previous notice to relatives,
and in such case, letters granted without such notice are invalid.
APPEAL from decree of Essex Orphans' Court.

J. W. .Field,for appellant.
A. TV. Bosinger, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RUNYON, Ordinary.-Paul Dabergott, who was a resident and
inhabitant of the city of Orange, in Essex county, died at sea September 1st, 1884, leaving a widow (the respondent) in Orange,
where he carried on his business. He died intestate. His widow
did not take out nor apply for letters of administration upon his
estate within fifty days from his death. On the 28th of October,
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1884, fifty-seven days after Mr. Dabergott's death, Isaac Gans, of
Orange, claiming to be a creditor of the estate, made application
for and obtained letters of administration. The widow had not then
applied for letters, nor had she renounced her claim to administration. Nor did she request that Mr. Gans should be appointed. By
his petition, Mr. Gans stated that the widow resided in Orange.
No notice was given to her of the application, nor had she any
knowledge of it. The letters were granted on the same day on which
the petition was filed. On the 15th of November, 1884, the widow
appealed, to the Orphans' Court of the county, from the order of
the surrogate, granting the letters. Mr. Gans, having been duly
cited, and the appeal heard, that court reversed the order of the
surrogate, and revoked the appointment of Mr. Gans, and granted
letters to Mrs. Dabergott. From that order Mr. Gans appealed to
this court. The letters to Mr. Gans were issued in disregard of the
provisions of the rule of the Orphans' Court on the subject.
The first rule provides that where the application for letters of
administration is by a person other than the next of kin or person
first entitled, or by one of several equally entitled, the applicant
shall produce to the surrogate the renunciation and request of the
persons entitled to letters, that letters be issued according to the
application, or proof that at least ten days' notice has been given to
the next of kin or parties by law entitled to the administration, if
any, of the application, and that the renunciation and request, if any,
shall be recorded in a book to be kept for the purpose. The appellane's counsel insists that the ninth section of the "act concerning
executors and the administration of intestate's estates " (Rev. 397),
provides for the issuing, without notice, of letters of administration
upon the estate of any intestate dying within this state to any fit
applicant where the decedent leaves no relations entitled to administration, or where he leaves any, and they do not-apply for letters
within fifty days after his death. It is true the act is silent on the
subject of notice, but the rule applies, and makes notification to, or
renunciation and request by those first entitled to letters, a pre.requisite to the grant of letters to any other person. The order
appealed from will be affirmed, with costs, to be paid by the appellant.
A court cannot, by the adoption of a

ing the mode of drawing the jury is

rule, deprive a party of a constitutional
right, as a trial by jury; Hinchly v.

valid; State v. Boatwriyht, 10 Rich.
407.

Machine, 3 Gr. 476 ; but a rule prescrib-

A rule providing that when proceed-
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ings for a road have failed, another application for such road shall not be acted
on for a year is valid: Towamencin
Road, 10 Penn. St. 195 ; and a rule
that petitions for roads shall only be
presented at a regular term of the court,
and not at an adjourned session, Road in
Little Britain, 27 Penn. St. 69 ; and a
rule that in certain cases the defendant
shall mark on the margin of his plea,
"by statute," Bartholomew v. Carter, 3
Mann. & Gr. 125 ; and a rule requiring
appeals to be taken in six months where
a statute prescribed nine months, Meloy
v. Squires, 42 Md. 378 ; and a rule that
a plea in abatement, if consisting of matter of fact not apparent in the face of
the record must be verified. Fogg v.
Fogg, 31 Me. 302; and a rule in chancery that no 'deposition shall be read
unless it is filed with the clerk on or
before the Saturday previous to the sitting of the court, Maultsby v. Carty, 11
Humph. 361 ; and a rule limiting the
right of witnesses, subpoenaed and attending court in several cases at the
same time to fees for mileage and attendance in one case only, Meffert v. Dubuque, Rd. Co., 34 Iowa 430 ; and a rule
that bail must justify either in the
county where the defendant was arrested
or where the action is pending, or where
the bail reside-the statute providing
that the bail must justify before a county
judge, Bonnell v. Esterly, 30 Wis. 549 ;
and a rule requiring a bill of exceptions
in a criminal case to be presented and
settled within ten days after the verdict,
Haines v. Commonwealth, 99 Penn. St.
410.
A rule cannot authorize the illegal admission of evidence, Kennedy v. Aferedith, 3 Bibb 465; nor restrict the time
within which a party may obtain the
instruction of the court to the jfiry
before
they retire, Bell v. North, 4 Litt, 133;
nor provide that the court would consider all questions decided by the court
on the trial as reserved, without a formal
exception taken at the time, Kennedy v.

Cunningham, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 538; nor
allow a defendant in a divorce suit more
than thirty days to answer, where a
statute prescribes thirty days as the limit,
Fagebank v. Fagebank, 9 Minn. 72 ; see
Meloy v. Squires, 42 Md. 378 ; nor provide that an attorney of record cannot take
an affidavit ofservice ofa summons,where
a notary, by statute, may take such affidavit, and the attorney of record was
also a notary, Youny v. Young, 18 Minn.
90 ; nor provide that every material
amendment shall be cause for a continuance, where the state provides that it nauy
be cause, Colhoun v. Crawford, 50 Mo.
458; Adams Express Co. v. Treqo, 35
Md. 47 ; Hayward v. Ramsey, 74 111.
372 nor require that a motion to dismiss
an appeal should be made at the first
term, where the appeal bond was void,
Pickett v. Pickett, 1 How. (Miss.) 267;
nor require that a motion in arrest of
judgment must be made the day after
the verdict is rendered, where the statute
provided that a motion for a new trial
must first be made and if denied, then a
motion in arrest, and the defendant
moved for a new trial after the verdict
which was not overruled until the following day, Wilkinson v. Daniel, Wright
368 ; nor require that an application for
a new trial must be made on the first
Saturday after the trial of the cause,
Pawley v. McGimpsey, 7 Yerg. 502 ; nor
require a defendant to pay the plaintiff
$20 for the privilege of answering after
his demurrer had been overruled, People
v. McClellan, 31 Cal. 101 ; nor require
a bill of exceptions to be prepared and
signed before a motion for a new trial
would be heard, Emery v. Emery, 54
Iowa 106; nor provide that unless the
party's request to have thejudge's charge
reduced to writing be made at or before
the beginning of the trial, it shall be
deemed to have been waived, Patterson
v. Ball, 19 Wis. 243; nor be inconsistent with a plaintiff's statutory right to
locate the venue of his action, Smith v.
Danzig, 64 How. Pr. 320 ; uor provide
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that a plaintiff may enter a judgment for
require a case for an appeal to be served
want of an appearance, although he has within ten days after written notice
not as required by statute filed his declara- of the decision or ruling, where the
tion prior to the return-day of the writ, statute allows ten days after the entry
Vanormer v. Ford, 98 Penn. St. 177 ; of the judgment and notice tereof, "or
nor permit an action ex contracts to be within such time as may be prescribed by
brought to trial out of its order on the the rules of the court," French v. Powers,
docket, on the affidavit of the plaintiff, 80 N. Y. 146.
his attorney or agent, of a belief that the
It has been held that a court's condefence is made for delay, and notice to struction of its own rules may be reviewed
the defendant or his attorney, unless it on appeal, Magill'sAppeal, 59 Penn. St.
be made to appear satisfactorily that the 430 ; Rathbone v. Rat bone, 5 Pick. 89 ;
defence is made in good faith, Fisher v. Baker v. Blood, 128 Mass. 545 ; Wall
Nat. Bank of Commerce, 73 Ill. 34 ; nor v. Wall, 2 Har. & Gil. 79 ; Abercombie
strike out a pleading party, Rice v. Eheie, v. Riddle, 3 Md. Ch. 320; Maultsby v.
55 N. Y. 518 ; nor alter a statute which Carty, 1I Humph. 361 ; but see Hqhes
gives the plaintiff in an action pending v. Jackson, 12 Md. 450; Adams Express
the right to examine the adverse party Co. v. Trego, 35 Md. 47; Gannon v.
on oath before service of the complaint,
Frtz, 79 Penn. St. 303.
Gle ney v. Stedwell, 64 N. Y. 120 ; nor
JOHN H. STEWART.

Spreme Court of Minnesota.
WELSH v. WILSON.
The fact that one transacts his business in the building that is his dwelling does not
divest it of its character as a dwelling, so as to make it lawful for an officer to break
the outer door for the purpose of serving civil process against the owner.
No valid levy can be made by means of breaking into the dwelling of the defendant, in the writ.
Where the sheriff makes an unlawful levy, and is sued for the trespasp, it cannot
be taken in mitigation of damages that, pursuant to such levy, he sold the goods,
and paid the proceeds to the execution creditor.
MITCEMLL, J., dissents on the ground that although the breaking is unlawful, the
levy is not absolutely void, and damages can only be recovered for the breaking and
not for the value of the goods.
APPEAL

from a judgment of the District Court, Waseca County.

Collester Bros., for respondent, Kate G. Welsh.
Lewis J. Leslie, for appellant, Hugh Wilson.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GiLFILLAN, C. J.-Plaintiff occupied in Waseca a building one
story high, of only one room. In this she, with her daughter,
slept; and did upon a kerosene stove what cooking she did, but
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usually got their meals at a restaurant. In it she also pursued her
trade as a milliner, and kept in it for sale, and exposed for sale, a
stock of millinery goods. It was fitted up like a store, with shelves,
tables for counters, show-cases on the tables, and one in front, on
and in which her goods were kept for sale. The defendant, sheriff
of the county, having an execution against her property, went,
about 10 o'clock in the morning, to the building, the door of which
was then locked, put his hand through the window, a pane of which
was broken, took the lock off the door, entered, and levied on and
removed her goods.
The validity of the levy is only in question. The room must be
taken to have been plaintiff's dwelling-her abode-not merely
when closed to business, but at all times while she occupied it for
her dwelling. The fact that she also used it to transact her business
did not change its character in that respect. It being her dwelling, it
was unlawful for the sheriff to break the outer door to effect an entrance
for the purpose of serving civil process. This proposition has never
been doubted, either in England or in this country. It is also well settled in this country-there being no authority to the contrary-that
no valid levy can be made by means of such unlawful entry. We may,
perhaps, regret that such is the rule; may be able to see that unfortunate consequences will sometimes result from it; but it is too firmly
established tobe disturbed exceptby act of the legislature. The levy
being invalid, nothing which the sheriff did pursuant to it was valid.
Every subsequent act based on the levy, and depending on it for its
lawfulness, was but a continuation and aggravation of the original
trespass. It can therefore be of no avail to the sheriff that he sold
the goods and paid the proceeds to the execution creditor. In the
cases where, as in Howard v. Mandefield, 31 Minn. 237, such
subsequent appropriation has been allowed to operate in mitigation
of damages, there has been a subsequent valid levy, not connected
with the trespass, which gave validity to the sale and appropriation
of the proceeds.
Judgment affirmed.
J. (dissenting).-The doctrine that, if a civil officer
a
dwelling-house
by forcing the outer door for the purpose of
open
levying upon the owner's goods, the levy is unlawful and void, rests
wholly upon the authority of Ilsley v. Nichols, 12 Pick. 269, which
other cases have merely followed. Although it may be presumpMITCHELL,
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tuous to question such eminent authority, yet I am unable to concur
in the doctrine of that case. The object of the legal maxim, that a
man's house is his castle, is the" protection of the inmates, and not
an immunity of goods from attachment on civil process.
The law in England seems always to have been that, although
the sheriff cannot break defendant's dwelling by force of a fierifacias,
but is a trespasser in the breaking, yet the execution which he then
doth in the house is good. Y. B. 18 E. IV., f. 4; Bacon's Abr.
"Sheriff, N. E. ;" Semayne's Case, 3 Rep. 93; Lee v. Gansel, 1
Cowp. 1. This seems to me to be on principle, and in its practical
operation the better rule.
Inasmuch as the officer has been enabled to make the levy by
means of his unlawful breaking, I do.not deny that the levy may be
voidable, so that the court might, on motion, made directly for that
purpose, set aside the levy and thus place the paurfies in statu quo.
But if the defendant allow the levy to stand, and sue for the trespass upon his dwelling, I do not think be can include in his damages the value of the non-exempt goods levied upon under the
process. To allow this would not, in its practical results, place the
parties in 8tat quo. If the trespasser is held liable for damages,
actual and exemplary, for the breaking, I think this will sufficiently
protect the inviolability of dwellings.
Looking at the matter from a practical standpoint, it seems to me
that the doctrine of the opinion will often work badly. This seems
to be virtually conceded by my brethren. And, the question being
one of first impression in this state, I think we are at liberty to
adopt the rule I have suggested.
When we first read this case the dictum
in Semayne's Case at once occurred to
us, and we at first thought that the dissenting opinion laid down the true rule
of law. We have, however, taken the
pains to examine the ease reported in
the Year Book, 18 Edw. IV., pl. 19, and
other authorities dependent thereon,
and have been compelled to change our
mind and concede the correctness of the
decision in the principal case. The
case 18 Edw. IV., .pl. 19, is translated
thus: " Catesby came to the bar and
showed how a fierifacias was directed
to the sheriff of Middlesex to make execution for one J., upon a recovery by

the said J. against one B.; and afterwards the said B. put all his goods into
a chest, closed and locked; and after.
wards the sheriff broke the door of the
house, and entered the house and took
the goods with him, &c. And whether
the sheriff had done- any wfong, &%
?
LITTETON, and all his companions,
held that the party might have a writ
of trespass against the sheriff for the
breaking of the house, notwithstanding
thefierifacias; for the fierifacias shall
not excuse him of the breaking the house,
but of the taking of the goods only."
Upon the slender authority of the last
clause of the last sentence above quoted,
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whieb at best is meagre in detail and
subject to very diflerent constructions,
depend all the subsequent Cases favoring
the views advocated in the dissenting
opinion. Semayne's Case, 5 Co. 9 1; s. c.
I Smith's Lead. Cas. (8th ed.), *183,
and Lee v. Gansel, Cowp. 1, 6, are as
to this point mere dicta, and Bacon's
Abridgment, Execution, n. 7, depends
for its authority entirely upon the dictum
in Semayne's Case.
In the ease of Yates v. Delamia~ne,
Trin. T., 17 G. 3, Bac. Abr. Execution,
n., p. 733, the court set aside an execution
levied upon the defendant's goods in his
dwelling-house, because the officer forcibly broke into the house to execute the
writ.
The case of Kerbey v- Denby, I M. &
W. 336, s. c. Tyrw. & Gr. 688, is important in this connection. This case
was trespass for breaking and entering
the plaintiff's dwelling-house and assaulting and imprisoning him, &c. The
pleas were first, not guilty.; secondly,
as to all the trespasses alleged except
the breaking of the house, a justification
under a writ of ca. sa. and warrant
thereon, by virtue of which the defendants entered the house-the outer door
being open-and arrested the plaintiff.
Replication (admitting the writ and
warrant), de injuriaabsque residoto causcu.
It was proved that the defendants, who
were bailiffs, in execution of the warrant, broke open the outer door of the
plaintiff's house, and so gained an
entrance and arrested him. Upon this
state of facts it was held, first, that the
averment in the plea that the outer door
was open was a material averment, for
that the door's being open was a condi-
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tion precedent to the defendant's right
to enter and arrest the plaintiff in his
house; and therefore that the plea was
sufficiently traversed by the general replication, and it was not necessary to
reply the breaking of the outer door
secondly, that the defendants having
become trespassers ab initio by the
breaking of the door, the jury were
rightly directed that they might even on
a plea of not guilty, give damages in
respect of allthe injuries complained of
in the declaration.
In the United States the doctrine held
by the majority of the court in the principal case is supported by the well-considered eases of llsley v.- Nichols, 12
Pick. 270 ; People v.Hubbard, 24 Wend.
369 ; Curtis v. Hubbard, I Hill 336;
s. c. 4 Id. 437 ; Closson v. Morrison,
47 N. H. 482 ; and upon the authority
of these cases the doctrine of the principal
ease may be considered as settled in this
country, as upon principle it ought to
be; for it would seem to be clearly
within the reason of the rule in the Six
Carpenters' Case, 8 Co. 146, s. a. I
Smith's Lead. Cas. *216, that if a man
abuse an authority given him by the law,
le becomes a trespasser ab initio.
The question involved is one ef great
practical importance in the ordinary ad.
ministration of justice, and it is somewhat surprising that the question should
not have been settled at a much earlier
date. In this country, however, it can
no longer be considered an open question ; and we doubt whether the dicta in
the old English authorities above cited
would now be followed even in England.
M. D. EwxLr.
Chicago, Ill.

MEHRHOF

v. MEHRIIONF.

United States Crcuit Court, Districtof Kansas.
MEHRHOFF v. MEIIRHOFF.
A married woman, in Kansas, can maintain an action in her own name for the
alienation of the affections of her husband, and depriving her of his society, care,
and support.
In an action by a wife to recover damages for the alienation of her husband's
affections, a complaint alleging that defendants began systematically to poison and
prejudice the mind of her husband by telling him false stories about her, and-charging
her with unwillingness and inability to do housework, and by treating her with gross
disrespect in his presence, and finally by falsely and maliciously charging her in his
presence with having committed adultery, is not sufficient, except as to the allegation as to the charge of adultery, and as to that it should be made more specific by
stating the time and place where the words were spoken, and what words were used.

AT LAw.

The opinion states the facts.

Day & Dodge and Maher & Osmond, for plaintiff.
if. D. McMullen and Dieffenbacker & Banta, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FOSTER, J.-The plaintiff sues to recover damages for an alleged
violation of her marital rights, in this, to wit : that the defendants,
who are the father and mother of William Mehrhoff, her husband,
conspired to separate the plaintiff and- her said husband, and to
deprive the plaintiff of the care and society of her said husband, and
alienate his affections from her; that, to accomplish the said purposes, the defendants began systematically to poison and prejudice
the mind of her husband against her by telling him false stories
about the plaintiff, charging her with unwillingness and inability to
do housework, and by treating plaintiff in her husband's presence
with gross disrespect, and finally by falsely and maliciously charging the plaintiff, in her husband's presence, with.having committed
adultery-by reason whereof, the affections of the plaintiff's husband were alienated from her, and caused him to treat her badly,
and with such cruelty that she was compelled to take her infant
child and flee from her husband's domicile in the night time, and
that he has completely abandoned her and said child; that he has
no property out of which she could be decreed alimony, etc., to her

damage, $5000. To the petition defendants file a general demurrer.
The main question presented in this case is this: Can a married
woman maintain an action in her own name for the alienation of the
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affections of her husband, and depriving her of his society, care and
support? It must be said that no such right or action existed under
the common law by reason of the legal unity of husband and wife.
Has the legislation on the rights of married women in this state
removed this barrier of the common law? In Westlake v. W estlake,
84 Ohio St. 621, this question is discussed at length under the
statute of that state, and the court, by a divided bench (a majority
of one), held that the wife could maintain her action. In Logan v.
Logan, 77 Ind. 558, the court, by a majority of one, decided that
under the statutes of Indiana the wife could not maintain an action,
but the words being slanderous, she could maintain her action of
slander. It will be observed from reading these cases that under
both the statutes of Ohio and Indiana the right of a married woman
to sue or be sued alone was restricted to certain subjects and causes
of action. Under the statutes of this state the right of a married
woman to sue and be sued is without restriction or limitation in
terms. It reads as follows: "A woman may, while married, sue
and be sued, in the same manner as if she were unmarried." St.
1879, chap. 62, sect. 8. The statute also protects her in the enjoyment of her separate real and personal property, and gives her the
right to sell and convey such property, and make contracts in
reference thereto, to the same extent as a married man in relation
to like property of his own. It also authorizes her to carry on trade
and business, and perform labor and service on her sole and separate account, and makes her earnings her sole and separate property, and gives her authority to invest the same in her own name,
etc. Sects. 1-4, chap. 62, Laws 1879.
In reference to the matter of suing or being sued she stands on
the same footing as the unmarried woman. For any violation of
personal rights an unmarried woman has the same remedy that a
man has. She may sue for an injury to her character, her person,
or her property. A right of action to this extent is clearly given
to a married woman under the statutes. Purrow v. O]kapin, 18
Kan. 112; Townsdin v. Nutt, 19 Id. 284. Words imputing unchastity to a female give her a right of action for slander, and it
seems to me that the provision of the statutes of Kansas was
intended to and does liberate a married woman from the commonlaw disability, so far as to enable her to sue for any violation of
her personal rights, as well as for injury to her property ; and, in
the words of the court in the case of Westlake v. Westlake, supra:
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"If at common law the husband could maintain an action for loss
of consortium of the wife, I can see no reason why, under our law,
the wife cannot maintain an action for the loss of consortium of the
husband." It is quite apparent by the language used that it is the
intent of the statute that a woman, so far as the power to assert or
maintain her rights in a court is concerned, should not be affected
by coverture ; and the law ini that respect places her where she was
before the marriage. It is true this right of action grows out of a
relation only arising where the married relation exists, but I have
but little doubt that it comes within the spirit and intent of the law,
and that it was the purpose of the legislature to permit a married
woman to sue for a violation of her personal rights; although such
rights grow out of the marital relations.
It should be remarked, in conclusion, that it is very doubtful if
the words or conduct imputed to the defendant are sufficient to base
this action upon, with the exceptions of the words charging the
plaintiff with adultery: Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. 577, cited in
Westlake v. Westlake.- As to this particular charge, the time and
place and, if possible, the words spoken should be set out in the
petition, so that the defendants may be informed exactly what charge
they are required to meet.
The demurrer will be sustained as to the latter objections-that
is, the insufficiency of the allegations in -reference to the words
spoken, as I have indicated-and overruled as to the other question, with leave to the plaintiff to amend within twenty days.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.
GRISWOLD v. N. Y. & N. E. RAILROAD COMPANY.
A condition in a free pass issued by a railroad company that the passenger will
make no claim for damages for injuries caused by the negligence of the railroad's
servants is a reasonable one, and will prevent a recovery of suchdamages even
though the passenger was a minor and the injuries were caused by gross negligence
on the part of the railroad employees.
The plaintiff was employed by the keeper of a restaurant at a railroad station to
sell sandwiches on the train. While sn-employed he applied for and obtained a free
pass, which, at the time of the accident, he was using to make a journey for his own
pleasure and not for the purposes of his business. Held, that the pass could not be
considered as issued for a consideration so as to give plaintiff the right of a passenger
fcr hire.

GRISWOLD v. N. Y. & N. E. RAILROAD CO.

W. C. Oase and P. E. Bryant, for plaintiff.
S. -E.Baldwin and E. D. Bobbins, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LoomIs, J.-The plaintiff's intestate, Charles P. Griswold, was
a boy about seventeen, employed by the keeper of a restaurant at
the defendants' station in Waterbury to sell sandwiches, fruits, &c.,
on all trains coming into Waterbury, having a free pass for that
purpose between Hartford and Fishkill. His employment did not
require him to travel as far east as Plainville, but his mother lived
there, and he often went there to visit her. In July 1883, he was
at Plainville for this purpose, and boarded a train bound thence for
Hartford, in order to stop off at Clayton and look at the wreck of a
train there caused by a collision the day before. The train. had
two passenger cars, and the conductor saw him on one of them
just after the train started, but afterwards, without the conductor's
knowledge, he went into the baggage car, and while there a collisionoccurred with another train coming westerly (there being but a
single track), which wrecked the engine and baggage car and killed
the intestate. He was at the time riding on a free pass which
provided that the person accepting it assumed all risk of accident,
and expressly stipulated that the company should not be liable,
under any circumstances, whether of negligence of their agents or
otherwise, for any personal injury.
The defence was placed on three independent grounds:
1st. The complaint was demurred to upon the ground that the
action was brought for the sole benefit of the estate of the intestate,
when it should have been for the benefit of the widow or heirs.
2d. That the intestate was guilty of such contributory negligence
as would prevent recovery, and
3d. That at the time of the injury he was travelling on the
defendant's train without the payment of any fare, 'under an agreement or condition expressly assuming all risk of accident, and
stipulating that the defendant should not be liable in any event for
injuries resulting from the negligence, &e., of its servants or otherwise.
As our views of the last question will be decisive of the whole
case, we will confine our discussion to that and waive the other two
questions.
Before we come to the discussion of the question whether, under
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the conditions of the pass, the law will protect the defendant from
liability, it will be necessary to determine whether the pass was
gratuitous, or upon consideration, for if the latter is true, the
defendants must be held to their full responsibility as carriers of
passengers. The plaintiff contends that the pass was part of the
consideration to induce Chickering to open a lunch-room in the
defendants' station at Waterbury, but the finding is silent in
regard to this, and we are not justified in assuming that it was an
element in the negotiations, or was in the mind of either party.
It was, on the other hand, obviously an afterthought, and when
asked for by Chickering he did not refer to it as a thing promised
by Holbrook or any one on behalf of the company. It was not
claimed as matter of right under any contract duty but merely as
matter of favor, and as such we must hold it to have been granted.
The question of consideration should be determined as in any
other case of contract. The existence of some selfish motive (if
any), impelling the act renders it none the less a gratuity in the
eye of the law, if there was no obligation at all to furnish the pass.
The restaurant business belonged exclusively to Chickering, whatever may have been the incidental benefits to the railroad company.
And besides, it is to be observed that at the time of the injury
the intestate was not travelling at all in the interest of the restaurant, but solely to gratify a personal curiosity, which could by no
possibility be any benefit direct or indirect to the railroad company ;
so that on the whole, we have no hesitation in calling his pass a
pure gratuity. We have then a case where the defendants gave a
free pass upon the express condition that the passenger would make
no claim for damages on account of any personal injury received
while using the pass, in consequence of the negligence of the defendants' servants. But the plaintiff, as the personal representative of
the one receiving the pass, has instituted a suit in direct violation
of the condition.
In ordinary transactions such a breach of good faith, to say
nothing of the breach of contract, would be disgraceful, but there
may be great considerations of public policy which will conceal the
private features of the transaction and make the-stipulation invalid
in the eye of the law.
By the English decisions, it is clear that the carrier has full
power to provide by contract against all liability for negligence in
such cases: MeCowley v. The Furness By. Co., L. R., 8 Q. B.
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57; R ll v.

. E. By. (Jo., Id. 437; Duff v. The Great V.

Ry. Co., L. R., 4 Irish Common Law 178; Alexander v.
Toronto . .Yepessing Rd. Co., 33 Upper Canada 474. (This
last case is almost identical with the one at bar.)
In the United States we find much contrariety of opinion. Some
state courts of the highest authority follow the English decisions
and allow railroad companies in consideration of free passage to
contract for exemption from all liability for negligence of every
degree, provided the exemption is clearly and explicitly stated:
Wells v. N.Y.Cent. Rd., 26 Barb. 641, and same case 24 N. Y.
181; .Perkinsv. Rd., Id. 208 ; Bissell v. 1N. Y. Cent. Rd., 25
Id. 442; Poucher v. N. Y. Cent. Rd., 49 Id. 263; -11aguinv.
Dinsmore, 56 Id. 168; Dorr v. N J. Steam Nav. Co., 1 Kernan
486 ; Kinney v. Central Rd., 32 N. J. L. 409, and 34 Id. 513;
WYestern and Atlantic Rd. v. Bishop, 50 Ga. 465.
Other courts also of high authority concede the right to make
such exemption in all cases of ordinary negligence, but refuse to
apply the principle to cases of gross negligence: 11. Cent. Rd. Co.
v. Reed, 37 Ill. 484; Ind. Cent. iRd. v. .Mfundy, 21 Ind. 48;
Jacobus v. St. Paul& Chieago Rd., 20 Minn. 125.
And other state courts of equal authority utterly deny the power
to make a valid contract exempting the carrier from liability for
any degree of negligence: Rd. v. Curran,19 Ohio St. 1; Mobile
Ohio Rd. v. Hopkins, 41 Ala. 486 ; Penn.Rd. Co. v. Henderson,
51 Penn. St. 315; Flinn, v. W'ilmington, fe., Rd. Co., 1 lloust.
(Del.) 469.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Rd. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, where a driver had a free pass to accompany
his cattle on their transportation, held, in opposition to the New
York and English cases, that the pass was not gratuitous, because
given as one of the terms for carrying the cattle for which he paid.
The reasoning of BRADLEY, J., was directed 'so strongly to the
disparagement of the New York decisions that it might have indicated an opposition to the principle of those cases in other respects,
had not the opinion concluded with this distinct disclaimer: "We
purposely abstain from expressing any opinion as to what would
have been the result of our judgment had we considered the plaintiff a free passenger instead of a passenger for hire."
The reasoning and the conclusions of the court therefore must be considered
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as all based on the assumption .that the passenger paid for his
passage.
The conclusions of the court were:
_First. "That a common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for
exemption from responsibility, when such exemption is not just
and reasonable in the eye of the law.
Secondly. "That it is not just and reasonable in the eye of the
law for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for negligence of himself or his servants."
We are not disposed to attempt to controvert the soundness of
these propositions as applicable to passengers for hire, but it remains
an open question, What is reasonable in the case of a free passenger ?
Will a just sense of public policy allow any distinction ? It seems
to us the two cases cannot be identical in the eye of the law or of
public policy, but that there is ample ground for a distinction.
In the first place, the arrangement between the parties ought not
to be regarded as a contract with the railroad company in its character as a common carrier, and therefore the stipulated exemption
is no abdication of that rigid responsibility which the law imposes
on common carriers.
The gratuitous accommodation concerns only the immediate parties, unless in a very indirect way, by making the fare of other
passengers higher. If, however, fares are unreasonable, they may
be subject to governmental regulation. But it will suffice to say
that the remote and indirect effect alluded to cannot make the
exemption void on the ground of public policy. Many other
gratuities and charities might be named, which, though conceded to
be commendable, would have a similar effect.
Again, in Bd. Co. v. Lockwood, supra, and in other cases advocating the same doctrine, one prominent reason given for holding
the contract void as opposed to public policy, is that in making the'
contract the carrier and his customer do not stand on a footing of
equality; that the latter is only one individual against a powerful
corporation, which has him in its power, and that he cannot afford
to higgle in regard to terms. It is manifest that this reasoning has
fo application at all to a free passenger.
If his position is not superior, it is at least equal, to that of the
railroad company. The latter will not often be found urging the
acceptance of free passes. There is no possibility of any "higgling"
on the part of the passenger for more favorable terms, and the
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solicitation for the pass itself will come from the latter also. Under
these circumstances it does not seem reasonable to add to a free gift
of transportation the burden of insuring the passenger against all
personal injuries arising from the negligence of the carrier's servants, the risk being well known and willingly assumed by the passenger, as the condition upon which the gift is made.
But it may be suggested that there is involved in negligence,
especially where the safety of life is concerned, a moral as well as.
legal culpability which renders such contracts of exemption void as
against public policy. But those who regard this argument as decisive must, it seems to us, overlook the fact that there may be, and
very often is, negligence that would be called gross on the part of
servants, for which there is no moral culpability at all on the part
of the master. The parties contracting for the exemption under
consideration well know that railroad passengers are continually
exposed to risks arising from some momentary lapse of memory or
attention on the part of servants who have gained a high reputation
for skill, prudence and carefulness, and who were, it may be,
selected on that account. A large percentage of accidents will be
found to have resulted- in the way suggested without any actual fault
on the part of the officers of the corporation. Now the finding in
the case at bar is explicit, that the injury to the plaintiff's intestate
resulted from the gross negligence of the defendant's servants.
This restriction is exclusive, and is to be understood as used in contradistinction to negligence on the part of the corporation itself
through the acts of those who properly represent it.
By the rule of respontleat superior a corporation is made liable
for the negligence of its servants, but where the principal has done
the best he could the rule is technical, harsh and without any basis
of inherent justice. As applicable ordinarily to corporations it is
of great practical convenience and utility. We do not therefore
advocate its abolition, but we contend that in a case like the present, where there is no actual blame on the part of the principal, it
is reasonable. in the eye of the law, that the party for whose benefit
the rule is given should be allowed to waive it in consideration of a
free passage. It is not thb case where a party stipulates for exemption from the legal consequences of his own negligence, but one
where he merely stipulates against a liability for imputed negligence, in regard to which there is no actual fault.
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It is easy to see, therefore, that considerations of public policy
have no application to such a case.
Where a master uses due diligence in the selection of competent
servants, and furnishes them with suitable means and machinery to
perform the service in which he employs them, he is not answerable
to one of them for an injury received in consequence of the negligence of another fellow-servant while both are engaged in the same
service. Here the rule of respondeat superioris waived, and it is
generally put on the ground of implied contract. And if a waiver
may be implied in such case why not give effect to an express
agreement in the case of a free passenger.
The Roman law, with its clear sense of justice, made a distinction
similar to the one for which we contend, in determining the liability
of the mandatory for the negligence of his agents. Where the
business of the mandatory required the interposition of sub-agents,
he was liable for the negligence of such sub-agents only on the
ground of culpa in eligendo, supposing he knew or could have
known their inadequacy.
The foregoing reasoning, as it seems to us, will also furnish a
complete answer to the claim that the defendant must be held liable
on account of the gross negligence of their servants, for it is manifest
that the principal is no more culpable in one case than in the other;
and the rule of respondeat superior being waived, the protection is
complete.
The word "negligence " in the stipulation for exemption is used
in its generic sense and comprehends all degrees.
And we may add that some high modern authorities have expressed
strong disapprobation of any attempt to fix the degrees of diligence
or negligence, because the distinction is too artificial and vague,
for clear definition or practical application. See the opinion of the
court in Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 382, and cases
referred to in a note on p. 383.
The only remaining question to be considered is, whether the
minority of the plaintiff's intestate, which rendered -him incapable
generally of making contracts, will render his assent to the limitation or condition of the pass void also.
But a minor has capacity in law to accept free gift, either absolute or conditional. If the condition or limitation is reasonable, he
cannot accept the gift and reject the condition or limitation ; for

